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NOTES AND COMMENTS
of a formal nature or so significant that it is essential to the ends
of justice.
(2) If the testimony is determined by the trial judge to fit either
of these two categories, then the attorney should be allowed to
testify for his client without withdrawing from the case.
(3) If the testimony is determined by the trial judge not to fit
either of these categories, then the attorney should not be permitted
to testify for his client unless he withdraws completely as counsel.
(4) If, however, a trial judge should allow an attorney to testify
for his client without first determining the nature of the proposed
testimony, and it is found on appeaJ that the testimony fits neither
of the permitted categories and should not have been admitted
without the withdrawal of the testifying attorney, then the appellate
court should not reverse at the expense of the client.
(5) Rather, in such a situation, a stated and suitable punishment
for the offending attorney should be incorporated into the rules
and regulations of the state bar association, the enforcement pro-
cedure being handled by the regular enforcement machinery for such
regulations.
WILLIAM E. ZIMTBAUM.
Pleadings-Last Clear Chance-North Carolina Requirements
Last clear chance in North Carolina, as a substantive doctrine, can
be defined in terms which have been consistently repeated and ap-
proved since the introduction of the concept late in the last century.1
A typical definition would be that the "contributory negligence of the
plaintiff does not preclude a recovery where it is made to appear that
the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided the injurious consequences to the plaintiff, notwithstanding
plaintiff's negligence; that is, that by the exercise of reasonable care
defendant might have discovered the perilous position of the party in-
jured or killed and have avoided the injury, but failed to do so." 2 Our
inquiry here is to determine what allegations, if any, are required in
the plaintiff's pleadings before a trial court in North Carolina should
submit to the jury the issue of last clear chance.
The most recent declaration by the North Carolina Supreme Court
concerning methods by which a plaintiff may avail himself of the doc-
trine of last clear chance was Collas v. Regan,3 which held that he was
'Gunter v. Wicker, 85 N. C. 310 (1881).'
'Ingram v. Smoky Mt. Stages, Inc., 225 N. C. 444, 447, 35 S. E. 2d 337,
339 (1945).
-240 N. C. 472, 82 S. E. 2d 215 (1954).
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not entitled to have the jury consider the doctrine because his plead-
irigs had not sufficiently raised the issue. The court said of the ap-
pellant's contention that the trial judge erred in refusing to submit
the issue that it could not now overrule past decisions holding that
last clear chance must be pleaded, and added that, in any event, the
evidence on the point was insufficient to support the submission of
the issue.4 As precedent for its position, the court cited two cases
which it characterized as "practical applications of the basic rule that
a plaintiff can recover only on the case made by his pleadings."
The earlier of the two cited cases, Hudson v. Norfolk Southern
Railroad Co.,6 held that a judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff
must be reversed because of the trial judge's error in instructing the
jury that the burden of proof on the issue of last clear chance was
on the defendant. Then, the court quoted from 11 Corpus luris 282
in reference to the burden of both pleading and proof, and stated: "In
order to invoke the 'last clear chance' doctrine, plaintiff must plead
and prove that the defendant, after perceiving the danger, and in time
to avoid it, negligently refused to do so."
'7
On this near-dictum was built the second cited case, Bailey and
King v. North Carolina Railroad.8 The facts there were as follows:
the plaintiffs' intestates, while riding in a truck in the City of Durham,
approached the defendant's track where the view was unobstructed for
several hundred yards, and then attempted to cross in front of an
oncoming passenger train, which was approximately 400 yards from the
crossing, traveling at a rate in excess of the speed limit and sounding
neither bell nor whistle. When on the track, the truck stalled, and as the
plaintiffs' witness described it, "the truck looked like it was trying to
get off, kinder moved back and forth and settled down at the time the
train hit it,"' a killing both occupants. In affirming a judgment of
non-suit, granted on defendant's motion at the close of the plaintiffs'
evidence, the court held that the testimony introduced by the plain-
tiffs conclusively proved their intestates' own negligence, and then
stated: "Furthermore, the plaintiffs do not plead the last clear chance,
which is required before such doctrine is available, paragraph 8(f) of
the complaint not being susceptible of such construction.' 0 At that
'Ibid. The evidence showed that the plaintiff was struck by the defendant's
automobile as he was crossing the street at night, while carrying a bag of gro-
ceries. The only allegation of negligence appearing in the plaintiff's complaint
was- that the defendant failed to maintain a proper lookout. See Transcript of
Record.
, Id. at 473, 82 S. E. 2d at 216.
6 190 N. C. 116, 129 S. E. 146 (1925).
7 Id. at 119, 129 S. E. at 147.
8223 N. C. 244, 25 S. E. 2d 833 (1943).
9 Id. at 246, 25 S. E. 2d at 835.0Id. at 248, 25 S. E. 2d at 835.
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point the court'again quoted the above-mentioned passage from Corpus
Juris and cited Hudson v. Norfolk Southern Railroad as authority for
its conclusion.
A look at the appeal record reveals that the plaintiffs, in para-
graphs 8(a) through 8(e) of their complaint, alleged specific acts of
negligence, i.e., excessive speed, failure to keep a proper lookout, un-
safe condition of the crossing; and then in paragraph 8(f) alleged that
"had the operators of said passenger train been operating said train
at a reasonable rate of speed, used due care and kept a proper lookout
that it would have discovered the said Chevrolet truck and its two
occupants upon said crossing as they had a clear view of at least 350
to 400 yards and recognized their position of peril and could have
stopped said train in ample time to have avoided the collision and the
death of the plaintiff's intestate.""
It seems fairly apparent, to this writer at least, that while the
plaintiffs' actual allegations do not explicitly parrot the Corpus Juris
phraseology suggested by the court as an acceptable standard for
pleading last clear chance, the allegations do attempt to emphasize the
intestates' position of peril or danger, which seems to be a key sub-
stantive element, and one which was missing from the Collas plead-
ings.12 If, as suggested in the Collas case, Bailey and King v. North
Carolina Railroad stands as a definitive expression of the North Caro-
lina view on pleading last clear chance, what is its full significance and
what procedural lessons can be learned from it? A review of some
general pleading problems and an inspection of the North Carolina
judicial history on pleading last clear chance will be of some help.
The effect of procedural law on the application of 'the doctrine of
last clear chance varies considerably among the states. 13 Some states
consider the doctrine to be essentially one of evidence and not of
pleading. 14 McIntosh apparently conceived North Carolina to be in
a somewhat comparable position, as he briefly stated that when "the
defendant pleads contributory negligence, it is deemed to be denied
without reply, and the plaintiff may also take advantage of the last
clear chance or plead it especially in reply."'15 For his authority he
cited Nathan v. Charlotte St. Ry. 16 where, in response to the defend-
1 Transcript of Record, p. 7, Bailey and King v. North Carolina Railroad,
223 N. C. 244, 25 S. E. 2d 833 (1943).
2See note 4 supra.
"See annotation, 25 A. L. R. 2d 257 (1952).
", Pfisterer v. Key, 218 Ind. 521, 33 N. E. 2d 330 (1941); Nielson v. Rich-
man, 68 S. D. 104, 299 N. W. 74 (1941); Masso v. E. H. Stanton Co., 75
Wash. 220, 134 Pac. 941 (1913).
" McINTosr, NORT CAROLINA PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 478 (1929).
20 118 N. C. 1066, 24 S. E. 511 (1896). The allegations in the complaint
were that the plaintiff paid his fare to ride the defendant's streetcar. While
being conveyed to his destination, he was thrown to the tracks and struck by
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ant's objection that the issue of last clear chance was improperly sub-
mitted to the jury because it was not raised in the complaint, the court
stated: "In contemplation of law, the injury is not attributed to the
wrongful act unless it is shown to be the immediate and proximate
cause. So that, the allegation by the plaintiff that the injury was
due to the defendant's carelessness, and the denial of that, coupled
with the averment by the defendant that the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff was the cause, necessarily involves the question of
whether the defendant negligently omitted to avail itself of the last
clear chance to avoid the accident by the performance of a legal duty"
(italics added),17 The court then affirmed its position in an earlier
case' 8 and held that if by refusing to submit the issue of last clear
chance the trial court had prevented the plaintiff from presenting to
the jury the law applicable to the evidence, "then it would be no
longer discretionary with the judge whether he would permit it to be
passed upon, but would become the right of the plaintiff to demand that
it should be."' 0
This idea was reinforced in a later case where a similar objection
was raised by the defendant that the trial court erred in submitting
the issue of last clear chance and in refusing a request for binding
instructions in his favor should .the jury find the plaintiff guilty of
negligence. The court answered defendant's exception by pointing
out that the trial court may not properly instruct the jury that the
proximate cause of the injury was the plaintiff's negligence when
the evidence indicates that the "negligence may have been concurrent,
or the last negligence may have been the plaintiff's, or notwithstand-
ing the negligence of the plaintiff, the defendant could, with the exer-
cise of ordinary care have prevented his horse striking, and his con-
veyance running over, the plaintiff. The jury and jury alone were
competent to determine the fact, for there was evidence for their con-
sideration."
20
In contrasting the Bailey with the Nathan case, the impression is
received that the North Carolina requirements for pleading facts which
permit recovery on the theory of last clear chance have been stiffened
in favor of the defendant. Yet it is difficult to determine from the
language of the Bailey decision whether, in fact, its apparent conflict
another of the defendant's cars, all of which was caused by the negligent, care-
less and wrongful operation of its streetcars by the defendant. See Transcript
of Record.
171d. at 1069, 24 S. E. at 511.
11 Baker v. Wilmington and Weldon R. R., 118 N. C. 1015, 1023, 24 S. E.
415, 417 (1896).
" Nathan v. Charlotte St. Ry., 118 N. C. 1066, 1069, 24 S. E. 511 (1896).
20 Wheeler v. Gibbon, 126 N. C. 811, 36 S. E. 277 (1900).
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with the Nathan case may not largely be due to a substantive rather
than a procedural difference.
Since the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, North Carolina
has not required explicit characterization or labeling of the theory under
which the plaintiff expects to recover, 21 but, quite the contrary, asks
only for a clear, concise statement of the facts which show a cause
of action under any theory.2 2 Although it is true that the plaintiff's
pleadings must properly apprise the defendant of the alleged cause of
action so that he may prepare his defense, the court has stated that
the ccmplaint should not anticipate a possible defense in the answer.
2 4
Therefore, in spite of the fact that the doctrine of last clear chance
does not begin to operate unless the plaintiff is guilty of negligence, 25
it is unlikely that the Bailey case means to impose upon plaintiffs the
burden of initially confessing their own negligence.
In the scope of this note, it would be impossible even to attempt
to span the substantive law of last clear chance in North Carolina with
its endless shadings and distinctions ;26 nevertheless, some mention of
it is necessary at this point. The court has held that the doctrine of
last clear chance does not apply to situations where the defendant's
train has struck a pedestrian plaintiff, who as a licensee or trespasser,
was on the defendant's track and apparently in full command of his
faculties. Railroads, in such instances, have been absolved on the
theory that the engineer is entitled to expect up to the moment of
impact that the pedestrian will remove himself ;27 therefore, any negli-
gent failure by the defendant to keep a proper lookout or to give
warning of its approach would merge with *the concurring negligence
of the plaintiff and bar recovery. An essential substantive element here
seems to be the "condition" of the plaintiff, i.e., whether his position
was such that the defendant was put on notice of the plaintiff's in-
ability to escape.28 Unless such notice of disability appears, the de-
fendant has no later chance to avoid the collision than does the plain-
tiff.
The Bailey case, although clearly distinguishable on its facts from
the pedestrian cases, follows their reasoning rather closely by holding,
"Thomas v. Atlantic and North Carolina R. R., 218 N. C. 292, 10 S. E. 2d
722 (1940)."N. C. GEx. STAT. § 1-122 (1953) ; Hill v. Buxton, 88 N. C. 27 (1883).
" Hussey v. Norfolk Southern R. R., 98 N. C. 34, 3 S. E. 923 (1887).
" Joyner v. P. L. Woodward & Co., 201 N. C. 315. 160 S. E. 288 (1931).
By way of dictum the court added that if a defense is anticipated and not nega-
tived in the complaint it is subject to demurrer.
" Redmon v. Southern Ry., 195 N. C. 762, 143 S. E. 829 (1928).
"8 For an interesting discussion of the substantive aspect, see Note, 33 N. C. L.
REV. 138 (1954).
" Beach v. Southern Ry., 148 N. C. 153, 61 S. E. 664 (1908).
" Neal v. Carolina Central R. R., 126 N. C. 634, 36 S. E. 117 (1900).
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in effect, that the intestates themselves had the last clear chance to
avoid the collision, in spite of the obvious differences in maneuverability
between pedestrians and occupants of stalled vehicles. If such is the
substantive law of last clear chance as applied to vehicle-train collisions,
allegations based on similar facts will not permit consideration of last
clear chance because the proof could not satisfy the legal definition
which the court has placed on the words "peril" or "danger." 29 There-
fore, the fault would lie not with the pleading form, but with a failure
of plaintiff's proof to avoid a finding that his negligence was concur-
rent, or "contributory" as a matter of law. The Bailey case might
easily have been decided without reference to the pleading form,
thereby preventing some of the precedural mystery of its holding.
Regardless of whether the court considers the doctrine of last
clear chance to be a theory alternate to and distinct from ordinary
negligence, or as merely a facet of the over-all inquiry into the proxi-
mate cause of the injury, the results are the same. A plaintiff hoping
to take advantage of the doctrine is evidently no longer permitted to
rely on the ordinary allegations of negligence with the privilege of get-
ting special instructions to the jury on the issue should the evidence
produce a case where the last clear chance doctrine would be applicable.
The recent North Carolina decisions seem to mean that specific facts
which would give rise to the operation of the doctrine should be pleaded
in the complaint on an alternative basis in a separate count, or included
by way of reply30 to an answer which sets up a defense of contributory
negligence.
ROBERT B. MILLMAN, JR.
Taxation-Ad Valorem Tax on Flight Equipment of Interstate
Airlines
Interstate business must pay its way1 and its "way" may properly
be regarded as the protection, services, and other benefits afforded by
those authorities through whose jurisdictions such business operates.
2
By daily use of airports, the aircraft of interstate carriers directly
receive a major part of the services and other benefits furnished by
the taxpayers of the jurisdiction in which the airports are located. It
would seem to follow that such aircraft properly may be the subject
of ad valorem property taxes.
"' Dowdy and Burns v. Southern Ry., 237 N. C. 519, 75 S. E. 2d 639 (1953).
"0 See Redwine v. Bass, 215 N. C. 467, 2 S. E. 2d 362 (1939).
'Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U. S. 252, 259 (1919).
'Ibid. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board, 347 U. S. 590, 606
(1954) ; Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U. S. 169, 174 (1949);
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 364 (1939).
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